Co-sponsored by: Hoda Al-Khazaimi

Countless systems ranging from consumer electronics to military equipment are dependent on integrated circuits (ICs). A surprisingly large number of such systems are already security-critical, e.g., automotive electronics, medical devices, or SCADA systems. If the underlying ICs in such applications are maliciously manipulated through hardware Trojans, the security of the entire system can be compromised. In recent years, hardware Trojans have drawn the attention of the scientific community and government. Initially, the primary attacker model was a malicious foundry that could alter the design, i.e., introduce hardware Trojans which could interfere with the functionality of a chip. Many other attacker models exist too. For instance, a legitimate IC manufacturer, such as a consumer electronics company, might be in cohort with a national intelligence agency and could alter its products in a way that compromises their security.

Even though hardware Trojans have been studied for a decade or so in the literature, little is known about how they might look, especially those that are particularly designed to avoid detection. In this talk we introduce several low-level manipulation attacks against embedded system, targeting two popular types of hardware platforms, ASICs and FPGAs

Speaker(s): Prof. Chris­tof Paar,

Location:
Room: A6-007
Bldg: New York University (NYU)
Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates